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Abstract
We investigate the timing of adoption of product and process innovation by using a diﬀer-
ential game in which firms may invest in both activities. We consider horizontal product
innovation that reduces product substitutability, and process innovation that reduces
marginal cost. First, we demonstrate that the incentive for cost-reducing investment is
relatively higher than the incentive to increase product diﬀerentiation. Second, depending
on initial conditions, (i) firms activate both types of investment from the very outset to
the steady state; (ii) firms initially invest only in one R&D activity and then reach the
steady state either carrying out only such activity or carrying out both; (iii) firms do not
invest at all in either type of innovation.
JEL classification: C73, D43, D92, O31.
Keywords: product innovation, process innovation, diﬀerential games, technology
life cycle
1 Introduction
Casual observation tells that firms carry out both product and process innovations, these
being driven either by technological complementarities or by the life cycle of technology.
However, these two factors have been investigated separately. One stream of research
has focussed upon complementarities within R&D portfolios in monopoly (Athey and
Schmutzler, 1995; Lambertini and Orsini, 2000; Lambertini, 2003, 2004; Lin, 2004) or
oligopoly (Rosenkranz, 1995; Bonanno and Haworth, 1998; Lin and Saggi, 2002). The
bottom line of this stream of research is that R&D eﬀorts in each direction boosts the
firms’ incentive to carry out analogous eﬀort in the other direction.
On the other hand, the technology life cycle describes the dynamics of product and
process innovation. The common view is that product innovation necessarily precedes
process innovation. Many reasons have been adduced to explain such belief. Abernathy
and Utterback (1975 and 1982) propose a model where firms initially tend to direct
most of their R&D resources to product innovation, because the market potential is
large and products have to find a proper “dominant design” (Porter, 1983) to match
consumers’ requirements. As the proliferation of brand new products crowds the market,
R&D profitability fades away and firms shift from product to process innovation. Klepper
(1996; see also Filson, 2002) highlights the role of firms’ innovative capabilities and size
in conditioning R&D spending. In particular, he suggests that the returns to product
innovation are highest at the very beginning because they depend on the acquisition of
new consumers, while the returns to process innovation are very attractive at a later stage
because they are proportional to the level of output produced by the firm. This gives a
rationale for the fact that firms tend to pursue first product and then process innovation.
Adner and Levinthal (2001) move some critiques to the traditional approach to tech-
nology life cycle, that they call a “supply-side” view of technological change. The main
limitation they emphasize is the exclusive attention to the internal capabilities of the firm.
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They propose instead a “demand side” approach where technology changes are driven by
the interaction between technology development and consumers’ heterogeneous demands.
Unlike what the traditional view maintains, they claim that the first phase is not always
characterized by the adoption of product innovation. This will depend on the initial per-
formance of the product on the market. The second phase is still characterized by the
predominance of process innovation, but it does not necessarily imply a sharp decrease in
the product innovation component. On the contrary, it considers the possibility that there
exists a third stage, not yet treated formally in the literature, where innovative activity is
a balance of product and process R&D in order to keep the price relatively stable and to
increase at the same time the relative performance of the product. Adner and Levinthal’s
distinction between “new to the world” and “new to the market” technology is crucial
to understand which activity firms implement first. The former corresponds to a prod-
uct whose initial technology is “crude”. The product is substantially new for customers
and an investment in product innovation is appealing due to the potential market that
could be created or expanded. In this situation the conventional life cycle holds, with an
initial predominance of product innovation and a subsequent shift to process innovation.
The latter refers to a product whose technology is very advanced; the possibilities for
improving the functionality of the product are then limited and firms could only invest to
reach a larger share of consumers. Initially they find it profitable to implement process
innovation to lower the cost of production but after a certain point they switch to product
innovation to further expand the market.
Others have stressed the diﬀerence between innovations and improvements, i.e., be-
tween technological breakthroughs and engineering refinements (see Doraszelski, 2004).
This allows one to understand that firms may not wait for future breakthroughs, while
there exists an incentive for them to delay the adoption of a new technology until it is
suﬃciently developed.
This paper bridges the two aformentioned lines or research and investigates the tech-
2
nology life cycle by using a diﬀerential game in which firms invest either in process in-
novation or in product innovation, or in both. In our framework product innovation is
conceived in a “horizontal” way as a reduction of product substitutability. Both invest-
ment activities generate a positive spillover for the rival.
The setup we adopt in the remainder of the paper allows one to analyse both the
innovation protfolio decisions and the life cycle characterising innovative activities. In
the light of the conclusions drawn by Adner and Levinthal (2001), and by virtue of the
dynamic nature of our approach, we shall privilege the latter aspect rather than the
former. In line of principle, there exist four diﬀerent perspectives: (i) firms activate both
types of investment activities from the outset up to the steady state; (ii) firms initially
invest only in product diﬀerentiation and then reach the steady state either carrying out
only product innovation or carrying out both; (iii) firms initially invest only to reduce the
cost of production and then arrive at the steady state either carrying out only process
innovation or carrying out both; (iv) firms do not invest at all in either type of innovation,
and they are driven to the steady state by the depreciation rate. First, we demonstrate
that the incentive for cost-reducing investment is relatively higher than the incentive
to increase product diﬀerentiation. This is due to the fact that, in the present setup,
product diﬀerentiation is a public good, in that any investment in this direction by either
firm fully spills over to the rival via the demand function. Second, we show that the
implementation of both innovative activities depends on the initial degree of product
substitutability compared with the initial marginal cost of production. In particular, this
is surely the case if initial conditions tell that products are very close (or even perfect)
substitutes and marginal cost is very close to consumers’ reservation price.
The multiplicity of equilibrium paths generated by our model is confirmed by casual
observation. The standard case where product innovation precedes process innovation is,
e.g., that of CD players or digital cameras, where the new product has been introduced
into the market at high prices, and subsequently the abatement of production costs has
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allowed firms to supply comparable varieties at lower prices. Conversely, the opposite
happens when firms restyling existing products once they have already abated production
as much as possible. Examples of this is the case can be found in the car industry, for
instance this applies for utility cars like Fiat Panda and Lancia Y10, which have undergone
a typical process of horizontal diﬀerentiation (i.e., restyling) at an advanced stage of their
life cycle. Finally, the third type of equilibrium with both innovations taking place at the
same time is observed in the PC industry (see Adner and Levinthal, 2001; Adner, 2004).
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the basics of the model.
Section 3 analyses the cases where firms perform only one type of activity. Section 4
considers the case in which firms invest both in process and in product innovation and
provides the main results of the paper concerning the time of adoption. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 The Model
We build a diﬀerential duopoly game over continuous time t ∈ [0,∞) , where at any
instant firms choose the quantity level and the investment level in either product or
process innovation, or both. Process innovation is formalized as a reduction in the unit
cost of production, while product innovation aﬀects product substitutability as perceived
by consumers.
Firms produce diﬀerentiated goods. As in Spence (1976) and Singh and Vives (1984),
the representative consumer’s utility function is a function of the consumption of the two
diﬀerentiated goods and the numeraire good m, and is given by:
u(q1(t), q2(t),m) = a(q1(t) + q2(t))− (q1(t)2 + q2(t)2)/2− s(t)q1(t)q2(t) +m, (1)
where s(t) ∈ [0, 1] .Constrained utility maximization for any given price pair {pi (t) , pj (t)}
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gives rise to the following demand system:
pi(t) = a− qi(t)− s(t)qj(t) ∀i 6= j, i, j = {1, 2} (2)
where the parameter s(t) represents the degree of substitutability between the two prod-
ucts. If s(t) = 1 products are completely homogeneous. At the opposite, for s(t) = 0,
products are independent and each firm acts as a monopolist. At any time t, the output
level qi(t) is produced at a constant marginal cost. Accordingly, the istantaneous cost
function is Ci (ci, qi, t) = ci (t) qi (t).
We assume that product diﬀerentiation can be aﬀected by firms’ R&D investment in
product innovation. The dynamics associated to product innovation is described by the
kinematic equation:
ds(t)
dt
≡ ·s = s(t) [−xi(t)− xj(t) + δ] (3)
where xi(t) represents the amount of eﬀort made by firm i at time t in order to increase
product diﬀerentiation through a reduction of s(t).1 The parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] indicates
the depreciation rate due to ageing of technology, which is common to both firms and
constant over time. A characteristic associated with horizontal product diﬀerentiation is
that is gives rise to a complete spillover eﬀect between the R&D activity undertaken by
the firms. Equation (3) can be rewritten as follows:
·
s
s(t)
= −xi(t)− xj(t) + δ (4)
so to highlight that the rate of change of product substitutability over time is linear in
the instantaneous investment eﬀorts.
Moreover, firms invest in process innovation; as a consequence, the marginal cost borne
by firm i evolves over time as described by the following kinematic equation:
dci(t)
dt
≡ ·ci = ci(t) [−ki(t)− θkj(t) + η] (5)
1The idea that s depends upon firms’ investment decisions has been investigated in static models by
Harrington (1995), Lambertini and Rossini (1998) and Lambertini, Poddar and Sasaki (1998). Recent
contributions apply this idea to diﬀerential games, e.g. Cellini and Lambertini (2002 and 2004).
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where ki(t) indicates the eﬀort made by firm i to reduce the cost of production. The
parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] measures the positive technological spillover that firm i receives
from the process innovative activity of the rival, while η ∈ [0, 1] is the depreciation rate,
assumed to be common to both firms and constant over time. It is easy to notice that the
rate of change of firm i’s marginal cost over time is linear in the instantaneous investment
eﬀorts, given that:
·
ci
c(t)
= −ki(t)− θkj(t) + η. (6)
Notice that (5) is indeed a dynamic version of the linear R&D technology employed by
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
The instantaneous cost of investing in product innovation and in process innovation
is respectively given by γ [xi(t)]
2 and β [ki(t)]
2. Both types of investment are financed
through internal funds. To firm i, hence, investing in both types of R&D implies decreasing
returns to innovative activity. The parameters γ and β are inverse measures of product
and process innovation R&D eﬃciency, respectively.
Instantaneous profits are given by:
πi(t) = [a− ci(t)− qi(t)− s(t)qj(t)] qi(t)− γ [xi(t)]2 − β [ki(t)]2 (7)
We assume that firm i aims at maximizing the discounted profit flow:
Πi(t) =
Z ∞
0
πi(t) e−ρtdt (8)
w.r.t. controls xi(t), ki(t) and the market variable qi(t), under the constraint given by
the state dynamics (3) and (5). The discount rate ρ > 0 is assumed to be constant and
common to both firms.
The corresponding current value Hamiltonian function is:
Hi(t) = e−ρt
h
πi(t) + λi(t)
·
s+ λii(t)
·
ci + λij(t)
·
cj
i
(9)
where λi(t) = µi(t)e
ρt, λii(t) = µii(t)e
ρt and λij(t) = µij(t)e
ρt, µi, µii(t) and µij(t) being
the co-state variable associated to s(t), ci(t) and cj(t), respectively.
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3 The two separated activities
In order to shed light on the relation between product and process innovation, we start
by considering the two activites separately. In the next section we will consider the case
where firms implement both types of innovative activity.
3.1 Product Innovation
Firms invest only in product innovation aiming at reducing the degree of product sub-
stitutability. At this time process innovation is not taken into account, hence ki(t) = 0
and the marginal cost c does not depend on firms’ innovative activity. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that the marginal cost is constant and common for both firms,
hence ci = c. Instantaneous profits are given by:
πi(t) = [a− c− qi(t)− s(t)qj(t)] qi(t)− γ [xi(t)]2 (10)
Firm maximize the discounted profit flow Πi(t) =
R∞
0
πi(t) e−ρtdt w.r.t. controls xi(t)
and qi(t), under the only constraint given by (3). The corresponding Hamiltonian function
writes:
Hi(t) = e−ρt
©
[a− c] qi(t)− qi(t)2 − s(t)qi(t)qj(t)− γ [xi(t)]2+ (11)
+ λi(t)s(t) [−xi(t)− xj(t) + δ]} .
The initial condition is s (0) = s0 ∈ (0, 1] . Firms play simultaneously. Firm i’s first
order conditions (FOCs) on controls are:2
∂Hi(t)
∂qi(t)
= a− c− 2qi(t)− s(t)qj(t) = 0⇒ q∗i (t) =
a− c− s(t)qj(t)
2
(12)
∂Hi(t)
∂xi(t)
= −2γxi(t)− λi(t)s(t) = 0⇒ x∗i (t) = −
s(t)λi(t)
2γ
(13)
2For the sake of brevity, in the remainder we omit the indication of exponential discounting.
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Note that both (12) and (13) contain the state variable s(t), which is common for both
firms. As a consequence, the open-loop solution and the closed-loop memoryless solution
do not coincide. The solution concept we adopt is the closed-loop Nash equilibrium.
We then take into account the feedback between player i’s strategy and player j’s state
variable. This will lead to an equilibrium characterized by subgame perfection.
We specify firm i’s co-state equation containing the feedback eﬀects:
−∂Hi(t)
∂s(t)
− ∂Hi(t)
∂qj(t)
∂q∗j (t)
∂s(t)
− ∂Hi(t)
∂xj(t)
∂x∗j(t)
∂s(t)
=
·
λi − ρλi(t)⇒
·
λi = qi(t)qj(t)−
s(t) [qi(t)]
2
2
− λi(t)λj(t)s(t)
2γ
+ λi(t) [−δ + xi(t) + xj(t) + ρ] (14)
along with the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
µi (t) s (t) = 0. (15)
We introduce the following:
Assumption qi(t) = qj(t) = q(t) and xi(t) = xj(t) = x(t).
This is the usual symmetry assumption involving no loss of generality as long as one
adopts the Nash equilibrium as the solution concept.
Then, from (12), we derive the equilibrium per firm output
q(t) =
a− c
2 + s(t)
, (16)
which coincides with the standard outcome of Cournot models with product diﬀerentiation
(see Singh and Vives, 1984; Cellini and Lambertini, 1998). Hence, given the implied
symmetry condition λi(t) = λj(t) = λ(t), from (13) we know that:
−λ(t) = 2γx(t)
s(t)
(17)
By symmetry, and using (17), the co-state equation (14) simplifies as follows:
·
λ =
[2− s (t)] [q(t)]2 − 4γx (t) [3x (t) + ρ− δ]
2s (t)
(18)
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From (17) we obtain x(t), which can be diﬀerentiated w.r.t. t:
·
x =
1
2γ
·
−
·
λs (t)− λ(t) ·s
¸
(19)
where, following the symmetry assumptions,
·
s = s(t) [−2x(t) + δ] (20)
Then, plugging (18), (17) and (20) into (19) and rearranging, one obtains:
·
x = x (ρ+ x)− s(t) (a− c)
2 [2− s(t)]
4γ [2 + s(t)]2
. (21)
The expression in (21) is valid for all s(t) ∈ (0, 1]; if s(t) = 0, optimal per period
investment is x(t) = 0.
We are now in a position to asssess the overall dynamics properties of the case under
study, being it fully characterized by (21) and (20). Steady state solutions are obtained
by solving the system
·
s = 0 and
·
x = 0. Given that explicit solutions are cumbersome, we
start by imposing
·
x = 0 to determine an equilibrium relation between x(t) and s(t):
x(s) =
−γρ [2 + s(t)]±
q
γ
©
γρ2 [2 + s(t)]2 + (a− c)2 [2− s(t)] s(t)
ª
2γ [2 + s(t)]
. (22)
The smaller root corresponds to a locus where x has always a negative value, and can
therefore be disregarded, being economically meaningless. Therefore, the optimal invest-
ment is:
xPd(s) =
−γρ [2 + s(t)] +
q
γ
©
γρ2 [2 + s(t)]2 + (a− c)2 [2− s(t)] s(t)
ª
2γ [2 + s(t)]
. (23)
where the superscript Pd stands for product innovation. Hence, by substituting (23) in
(3) and solving for s, we get three solutions:
s = 0; s =
(a− c) [(a− c)±Ψ]− 2δγ (δ + 2ρ)
(a− c)2 + δγ (δ + 2ρ)
(24)
where Ψ ≡
q
(a− c)2 − 8δγ (δ + 2ρ). It is immediate to prove that:
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Lemma 1 The solutions s =
(a− c) [(a− c)±Ψ]− 2δγ (δ + 2ρ)
(a− c)2 + δγ (δ + 2ρ)
are real if and only if
(a− c)2−8δγ (δ + 2ρ) > 0, or γ ≤ (a− c)
2
8δ (δ + 2ρ)
= eγ. This also ensures that s ∈ [0, 1] .
The statement of the above lemma amounts to requiring that firms need to face a
suﬃciently low cost of production for the investment in product innovation to start.
We will come back to this point while analyzing the possibility for firms to undertake
simultaneously process and product R&D activities.
Considering the stability of the system, the following can be shown to hold:
Proposition 1 Provided that γ ≤ eγ, the steady state point
sPd =
(a− c) [(a− c)−Ψ]− 2δγ (δ + 2ρ)
(a− c)2 + δγ (δ + 2ρ)
,
xPd =
δ
2
is the unique saddle point equilibrium of the game when firms invest only in product
innovation.
Proof. The Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system formed by (3) and (21) is (under
symmetry):
JPd =


∂
·
s
∂s
= δ − 2x ∂
·
s
∂x
= −2s
∂
·
x
∂s
=
(a− c)2 (3s− 2)
2γ (2 + s)3
∂
·
x
∂x
= ρ+ 2x

 (25)
whose trace and determinant are:
T
¡
JPd
¢
= ρ+ δ; (26)
∆
¡
JPd
¢
= (δ − 2x) (ρ+ 2x) + (a− c)
2 (3s− 2) s
γ (2 + s)3
.
Evaluating ∆
¡
JPd
¢
in
¡
sPd, xPd
¢
, we have:
∆
¡
JPd
¢
∝ −16δγ (δ + 2ρ)
£
(a− c)2 − 8δγ (δ + 2ρ)
¤ £
(a− c)2 + δγ (δ + 2ρ)
¤
(27)
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where the expression on the r.h.s. is surely negative on the basis of the condition war-
ranting the reality of sPd. Therefore, ∆
¡
JPd
¢
< 0 in
¡
sPd, xPd
¢
, which qualifies as the
unique saddle point equilibrium.
An intuitive illustration of saddle point stability can be obtained by investigating the
dynamics of the system in the positive quadrant of the space {s, x}, which is described
in Figure 1. The locus
·
s = 0 is given by the s = 0 and x = δ/2, while the locus
·
x = 0
draws a curve over the admissable values of s.3 The dynamics of s and x are respectively
summarized by vertical and horizontal arrows.
Figure 1 : The phase diagram in the product innovation case
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From the phase diagram, it is clear that this saddlepoint equilibrium can be approached
only along the north-est arm of the saddle path. It is also immediate to demonstrate that
3The curve
·
x = 0 may or may not cross twice the vertical line x = δ/2 within the admissable values
of s ∈ [0, 1]. In Figure 1 we depict the situation where they cross only once.
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sPd ∈ [0, 1] .
Comparative statics exercises can be carried out on xPd(s) to show that:
∂xPd(s)
∂s
∝ 2− 3s (t) ; ∂x
Pd(s)
∂c
< 0. (28)
The first partial derivative implies that the incentive to implement product innovation is
non-monotone in the degree of product diﬀerentiation. In particular, ∂xPd(s)/∂s > 0 if
and only if s ∈ [0, 2/3) , i.e., firms have a strong incentive to diﬀerentiate their products
varieties if they are close substitutes. As soon as product diﬀerentiation is large enough,
R&D eﬀorts start decreasing. The second derivative in (28) shows that the optimal
investment is everywhere decreasing in the level of marginal cost, for any given s (t)
before the steady state is reached. The obvious reason is that a decrease in c, all else
equal, entails a higher gross profits and therefore a larger source of internal funds to be
invested in R&D activities.
Now examine the eﬀect of a variation in c on the steady state level of substitutability
(see Proposition 1), to verify easily that ∂sPd/∂c > 0 always. The explanations is that,
the higher is c, the lower is the amount of internal funds available ti finance R&D at any
time during the game; as a result, the steady state degree of substitutability is positively
related to marginal production cost. The same applies along the optimal investment
path, as it can be verified by inverting xPd(s) to obtain sPd(x), and then checking that
∂sPd(x)/∂c > 0.
3.2 Process Innovation
Consider the case where firms are allowed to undertake only process innovation R&D,
hence xi(t) = 0 and the parameter s measuring product substitutability does not change
over time. Instantaneous profits are given by:
πi(t) = [a− ci(t)− qi(t)− sqj(t)] qi(t)− β [ki(t)]2 (29)
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Firms maximize the discounted profit flow w.r.t. controls ki(t) and qi(t), under the
constraints (5). The corresponding Hamiltonian function writes:
Hi(t) = e−ρt
©
[a− c(t)] qi(t)− qi(t)2 − sqi(t)qj(t)− β [ki(t)]2+ (30)
+λii(t)ci(t) [−ki(t)− θkj(t) + η] + λij(t)cj(t) [−kj(t)− θki(t) + η]} .
The initial condition is c (0) = c0 ∈ (0, a] . Firm i’s first order conditions (FOCs) on
controls are:4
∂Hi(t)
∂qi(t)
= a− ci(t)− 2qi(t)− sqj(t) = 0⇒ q∗i (t) =
a− ci(t)− sqj(t)
2
(31)
∂Hi(t)
∂ki(t)
= −2βki(t)− λii(t)ci(t)− λij(t)θcj(t) = 0⇒ k∗i (t) = −
[ci(t)λii(t) + θλij(t)cj(t)]
2β
(32)
Note that (31) does not contain the state variable (5) of the rival, which is however
present in (32). At a first sight there seem then to be a feedback between the R&D
decisions, at least for any positive spillover eﬀect.5 However, it is possible to prove that:
Lemma 2 The open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game with firms investing only in
process innovation is subgame (or Markov) perfect.
Proof. We show that the present game is a perfect game in the sense of Leitmann
and Schmitendorf (1978) and Feichtinger (1983).6 We basically need to prove that no
feedback eﬀect are actually present, even for positive spillover levels.
Let us write the co-state equations:
−∂Hi(t)
∂ci(t)
− ∂Hi(t)
∂kj(t)
∂k∗j (t)
∂ci(t)
=
·
λii − ρλii(t)⇔ (33)
4As before, we omit the indication of the exponential discounting.
5If θ = 0 the two investment plans are completely independent and therefore it evident that no
feedback eﬀect operates.
6We remind that a diﬀerential game is perfect whenever the closed-loop equilibrium collapses into the
open-loop one, the latter being thus strongly time consistent, i.e. subgame perfect. For further details,
see Mehlmann (1988, Ch. 4) and Dockner et al. (2000, Ch. 7).
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·
λii = qi(t) + λii(t) [ki(t) + θkj(t) + ρ− η]−
θ
2β
λji(t) [λij(t)cj(t) + θλii(t)ci(t)]
−∂Hi(t)
∂cj(t)
− ∂Hi(t)
∂ki(t)
∂k∗i (t)
∂cj(t)
=
·
λij − ρλij(t)⇔ (34)
·
λij = λij(t)
½
[kj(t) + θki(t) + ρ− η]−
θ
2β
[2βki(t) + λii(t)ci(t) + θλij(t)cj(t)]
¾
where
∂Hi(t)
∂kj(t)
∂k∗j (t)
∂ci(t)
captures the feedback eﬀects, and partial derivatives ∂k∗j (t)/∂ci(t) are calculated using
the optimal values of investment as from (32), i.e.
k∗j (t) = −
cj(t)λjj(t) + λji(t)θci(t)
2β
(35)
These conditions must be evaluated along with the initial conditions {ci(0)} = {c0,i}
and the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞
µij (t) cj (t) = 0, i, j = 1, 2. (36)
From (34) one can note that
·
λij = 0 in λij(t) = 0. We can rewrite the expression for
the optimal investment of firm i as follows:
k∗i (t) = −
λii(t)ci(t)
2β
(37)
which entails that ∂k∗i (t)/∂cj(t) = 0. This holds for both firms due to the underlying
symmetry of the model. Feedback (cross-) eﬀects are nil along the equilibrium path and
hence the open-loop is a degenerate closed-loop one, and it is strongly time consistent, or
equivalently, subgame perfect.7
7For a dynamic R&D game where knowledge accumulation has a strategic eﬀect during the game
itself, see Doraszelski (2003).
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On the basis of Lemma 2, we can proceed with the characterisation of the open-loop
solution. The first order conditions on control as well as the transversality conditions are
the same as above, while the co-state equations simplify as follows:
−∂Hi(t)
∂ci(t)
−∂Hi(t)
∂kj(t)
∂k∗j (t)
∂ci(t)
=
·
λii−ρλii(t)⇔
·
λii = qi(t)+λii(t) [ki(t) + θkj(t) + ρ− η] (38)
−∂Hi(t)
∂cj(t)
− ∂Hi(t)
∂ki(t)
∂k∗i (t)
∂cj(t)
=
·
λij − ρλij(t)⇔
·
λij = λij(t) {[kj(t) + θki(t) + ρ− η]} (39)
Moreover, we can diﬀerentiate w.r.t. time the expression for the optimal R&D eﬀort
that appears in (32) to get the dynamic equation of ki(t):
·
ki = −
1
2β
½
ci(t)
·
λii + λii(t)
·
ci + θ
·
cj(t)
·
λij + λij(t)
·
cj
¸¾
. (40)
with
·
λii and
·
λij that obtain from (38) and (39) respectively. Moreover, from (32) we get
an explicit expression for λii(t), i.e.
λii(t) = −
2βki(t) + θλij(t)cj(t)
ci(t)
which can used to further simplify (32). As to the second co-state variable, its dynamic
equation (39) must be trated autonomously and, by imposing stationarity, i.e.
·
λij = 0,
we obtain λij(t) = 0. This yields:
·
ki = ρki(t)−
ci(t)qi(t)
2β
(41)
As before, we introduce the symmetry assumption:
Assumption qi(t) = qj(t) = q(t) and ki(t) = kj(t) = k(t).
We further assume ci(t) = cj(t) = c(t) and from (31) obtain the equilibrium per firm
output q =
a− c(t)
2 + s
. It is now immediate to rewrite (41) as
·
k = ρk(t)− c (t) [a− c(t)]
2β (2 + s)
. (42)
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Steady state solutions are obtained by solving the system
·
k = 0 and
·
c = 0. We start
by imposing the stationarity condition
·
k = 0 to determine an equilibrium relation between
k(t) and c(t):
kPs (c) =
c(t) [a− c(t)]
2βρ (2 + s)
(43)
where the superscript Ps stands for process innovation. Hence, by substituting (43) in
(5) and solve for c, we obtain three solutions, namely:
c = 0; c =
1
2
(
a±
p
(1 + θ) [a2 (1 + θ)− 8βηρ (2 + s)]
1 + θ
)
(44)
Before proceeding, it is immediate to note that:
Lemma 3 The solutions c = 1
2
(
a±
p
(1 + θ) [a2 (1 + θ)− 8βηρ (2 + s)]
1 + θ
)
are real if
and only if a2 (1 + θ)− 8βηρ (2 + s) > 0, or s < a
2 (1 + θ)
8βηρ
− 2 = es.
As a consequence, firms then invest in process innovation only when goods are suﬃ-
ciently diﬀerentiated.
We now check the stability conditions of the system. The following can be shown to
hold:
Proposition 2 Provided that s ≤ es, the steady state point
cPs =
1
2
(
a−
p
(1 + θ) [a2 (1 + θ)− 8βηρ (2 + s)]
1 + θ
)
,
kPs =
η
1 + θ
is the unique saddle point equilibrium of the game when firms invest only in process in-
novation.
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Proof. Under symmetry, the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system formed by (5)
and (42) is:
JPs =


∂
·
c
∂c
= η − k (1 + θ) ∂
·
c
∂k
= −c (1 + θ)
∂
·
k
∂c
= − a− 2c
2β (2 + s)
∂
·
k
∂k
= ρ

 (45)
whose trace and determinant are:
T
¡
JPs
¢
= ρ+ η − k (1 + θ) ; (46)
∆
¡
JPs
¢
= [η − k (1 + θ)] ρ− c (a− 2c) (1 + θ)
2β (2 + s)
.
Evaluating ∆
¡
JPs
¢
in
¡
cPs, kPs
¢
, we verify that:
∆
¡
JPs
¢
∝ −8βηρ (2 + s) (1 + θ) (47)
where the expression on the r.h.s. is negative. Accordingly, the determinant is negative in
correspondence of the steady state point
¡
cPs, kPs
¢
, which qualifies as the unique saddle
point equilibrium of the game.
As in the product innovation case, we may resort to the phase diagram to illustrate
saddle point stability. The locus
·
c = 0 is given by the c = 0 and k = η/ (1 + θ), while the
locus
·
k = 0 draws a curve in the space {c, k} as described in Figure 2.
As in the previous setting, we now proceed to some comparative statics exercises on
kPs (c) and cPs, to obtain the following:
∂kPs (c)
∂c
∝ a− 2c (t) ; ∂k
Ps (c)
∂s
< 0 ;
∂cPs
∂s
> 0. (48)
The first derivative in (48) shows that the optimal R&D eﬀort for process innovation
is non-monotone in the level of the marginal cost, with R&D eﬀorts initially increasing
as c (t) departs from c0 (provided c0 ∈ (a/2, a)), and then decreasing as soon as c (t)
goes below a/2.8 The remaining two properties in (48) are intuitive, since (i) the higher
8Note that cPs is surely lower than a/2.
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is the substitutability between products, the lower are gross profits at any instant; as
a consequence, internal funds for process R&D shrink; and (ii), steady state marginal
cost is positively related to substitutability, which replicates the propery we have already
highlighted in the previous subsection concerning product innovation. As for (i), also in
this case a higher level of substitutability decreases the available funds for financing R&D
for process innovation.
Figure 2 : The phase diagram in the process innovation case
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4 Process and Product Innovation
We now analyse the most interesting case, where firms implement simultaneously process
and product innovation. Instantaneous profits are given by (7) and firms maximize the
discounted profit flow w.r.t. controls xi(t), ki(t) and qi(t), under the constraints repre-
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sented by (3) and (5). The corresponding Hamiltonian function writes:
Hi(t) = e−ρt
©
[a− c(t)] qi(t)− qi(t)2 − s(t)qi(t)qj(t)− γ [xi(t)]2 − β [ki(t)]2+ (49)
+λi(t)s(t) [δ − xi(t)− xi(t)] + λii(t)ci(t) [η − ki(t)− θkj(t)] +
+λij(t)cj(t) [η − kj(t)− θki(t)]}
We assume η = δ, i.e. the depreciation rates associated to process innovation technology
and to product innovation technology are exactly the same.
Firms play simultaneously. Firm i’s first order conditions (FOCs) on controls are
equivalent to (12), (13) and (32). The co-state equations for the closed-loop Nash equilib-
rium also coincide with those derived when treating the two types of innovation separately,
i.e., (14), (38) and (39). As a consequence, the dynamic equations of controls coincide
with (19) and (42). Imposing stationarity on states and controls, we find the following
equilibrium expressions:
s∗ (c) =
(a− c)2 − 2δγ (δ + 2ρ)− (a− c)Ψ
(a− c)2 + δγ (δ + 2ρ)
c∗ (s) =
1
2
(
a−
p
(1 + θ) [a2 (1 + θ)− 8βηρ (2 + s)]
1 + θ
)
where Ψ ≡
q
(a− c)2 − 8δγ (δ + 2ρ). Provided that s∗ (c) and c∗ (s) belong to R, then
also s∗ (c) ∈ [0, 1] and c∗ (s) ∈ [0, a] . However, note that
s∗ (c) ∈ R iﬀ ρ < (a− c)
2 − 8δ2γ
16δγ
(50)
c∗ (s) ∈ R iﬀ ρ < a
2 (1 + β)
8βδγ (2 + s)
(51)
Now, it is apparent that there surely exists a range of admissible values for the discount
rate satisfying (51), while it is possible that (a− c)2 < 8δ2γ. If so, then (50) is impossi-
ble, which entails that there is no real solution for the product innovation problem. In
such a case, firms only proceed to activate R&D for process innovation, while product
diﬀerentiation remains at the initial condition s0. This leads to the following Lemma:
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Lemma 4 Firms’ incentives towards R&D for process and product innovation can be
charaterised in therms of their time preferences:
• if a
2 (1 + β)
8βδγ (2 + s)
>
(a− c)2 − 8δ2γ
16δγ
> 0, then (i) ∀ρ ∈
"
0,
(a− c)2 − 8δ2γ
16δγ
!
firms ac-
tivate both process and product innovation; (ii) ∀ρ ∈
Ã
(a− c)2 − 8δ2γ
16δγ
,
a2 (1 + β)
8βδγ (2 + s)
!
,
firms invest in process innovation only;
• if (a− c)
2 − 8δ2γ
16δγ
>
a2 (1 + β)
8βδγ (2 + s)
> 0, then (i) ∀ρ ∈
·
0,
a2 (1 + β)
8βδγ (2 + s)
¶
firms acti-
vate both process and product innovation; (ii) ∀ρ ∈
Ã
a2 (1 + β)
8βδγ (2 + s)
,
(a− c)2 − 8δ2γ
16δγ
!
,
firms invest in product innovation only;
• if a
2 (1 + β)
8βδγ (2 + s)
> 0 >
(a− c)2 − 8δ2γ
16δγ
, then firms can only activate process R&D
∀ρ ∈
·
0,
a2 (1 + β)
8βδγ (2 + s)
¶
.
Lemma 4 states that, in general, the incentive for cost-reducing investment is relatively
higher then the incentive to increase product diﬀerention. The explanation of this result
can be found in the fact that, while investing in product diﬀerentiation entails a full
spillover via the demand function, any eﬀort aimed at decreasing marginal cost involves
only a partial spillover measured by θ ∈ [0, 1] .
Now we focus on the situation where real solutions exist on both sides, to evaluate
the bearings of initial conditions on the optimal investment portfolio of firms. That is,
provided both types of innovations are viable, shall we expect to observe either one or the
other, or both in equilibrium?
To address this question, we may carry out a partition of the state space {c, s} where
we draw the equilibrium solutions (c∗ (s) , s∗ (c)) , as in Figure 1. Both (50) and (51) are
concave in the other state variable, and for admissible values of parameters {a, β, γ, δ, θ, ρ}
cross only once within the rectangular region defined by c∗ (s) ∈ [0, a] and s∗ (c) ∈ [0, 1] .
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This identifies four regions in the relvant space of states. Since s∗ (c) solves
·
s = 0, for all
s > s∗ (c) we know that
·
s < 0. This implies that in such a region, firms invest in product
innovation. Likewise, c∗ (s) solves
·
c = 0; accordingly, for all c > c∗ (s) , we have
·
c < 0. In
this region, firms ivest in cost-reducing R&D activities. These two regions overlap in the
cone to the north-east of the equilibrium point E. Therefore, if initial condition (c0, s0)
identify a point belonging to the cone, then firms activate both types of investment from
the very outset to the steady state. Otherwise, if, say, initial conditions identify point
A to the north-west of both equilibrium loci, then firms initially invest only in product
diﬀerentiation. Depending upon whether optimal trajectories cross the cone or not, firms
may reach the steady state either (i) by carrying out only product innovation, allowing
the marginal cost to adjust via the exogenous depreciation rate, or (ii) by carrying out
both. The same argument goes through, mutatis mutandis, if initial conditions identify
a point like B. In the residual region to the south-west of the equilibrium point, firms do
not invest at all in either type of innovation, and they are driven to the steady state by
the depreciation rate.
This discussion ultimately entails that the present model provides a theoretical frame-
work corresponding to the main message conveyed by the empirical research in this field,
revealing that firms first operate product innovation and later on implement process inno-
vation. However, this theoretical setup also allows for other equilibrium solutions where
process innovation comes first, or both types of activities coexist over the life cycle. This
is consistent with Adner and Levinthal (2001), whose ‘demand side’ approach does not
necessarily imply a well defined hierarchy between the two types of innovation.
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Figure 3 : Process and Product Innovation
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Now we come to the evaluation of the stability properties of the complete model with
both types of innovation. Given that, in this case, the relevant Jacobian matrix is 4× 4,
one cannot draw the phase diagram. The Jacobian matrix is:
J∗ =


∂
·
s
∂s
= δ − 2x ∂
·
s
∂x
− 2s ∂
·
s
∂c
= 0
∂
·
s
∂k
= 0
∂
·
x
∂s
=
(a− c)2 (3s− 2)
2γ (2 + s)3
∂
·
x
∂x
= ρ+ 2x
∂
·
x
∂c
=
(a− c) (2− s) s
2γ (2 + s)2
∂
·
x
∂k
= 0
∂
·
c
∂s
= 0
∂
·
c
∂x
= 0
∂
·
c
∂c
= η − k (1 + θ) ∂
·
c
∂k
= −c (1 + θ)
∂
·
k
∂s
=
c (a− c)
2β (2 + s)2
∂
·
k
∂x
= 0
∂
·
k
∂c
= − a− 2c
2β (2 + s)
∂
·
k
∂k
= ρ


(52)
whose characteristic equations yields four eigenvalues. Unfortunately, assessing the sign
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of such eigenvalues analytically is not feasible as their expressions are cumbersome. More-
over, we cannot obtain the explicit solutions for c∗ and s∗ as a function of parameters
only, as the system
c− c∗ (s) = 0
s− s∗ (c) = 0
(53)
is made up by equations whose degree is higher than four.
However, we may resort to numerical calculations, which can be performed as follows.
We use the solutions:
x∗ =
δ
2
; k∗ =
δ
1 + θ
(54)
and set the numerical values of parameters:
a = 1;β = γ =
1
2
; θ =
1
5
; δ = ρ =
1
20
. (55)
Then, we may (i) solve the system (53) numerically, and (ii) compute the eigenvalues
{ζ1, ζ2, ζ3, ζ4} of J∗. Given (55), we have:
c∗ ' 0.0042 ; s∗ ' 0.0076 (56)
ζ1 ' 0.1288 ; ζ2 ' 0.0808 (57)
ζ3 ' −0.0308 ; ζ4 ' −0.0288.
Using instead:
a = 8;β = γ =
1
2
; θ =
1
2
; δ =
1
20
; ρ =
1
40
, (58)
we obtain:
c∗ ' 0.002 ; s∗ ' 0.0001 (59)
ζ1 ' 0.0999 ; ζ2 ' 0.0499 (60)
ζ3 ' −0.0249 ; ζ4 ' −0.0249.
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In general, repeating the same exercise for admissible parameter values, one can verify
that the outcome is regularly ζ1, ζ2 > 0 while ζ3, ζ4 < 0. Therefore, the equilibrium is a
saddle point.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have investigated the product/technology life cycle by using a diﬀerential
game in which firms may invest in product and process innovation. We have considered
horizontal product innovation that reduces product substitutability, and process innova-
tion reducing marginal production cost. The solution concept we have adopted is the
closed-loop Nash equilibrium.
The main question we have addressed, in the light of the existing debate based upon
empirical evidence, is about the relative timing of adoption of product and process inno-
vations. We have shown that firms may activate both activities simultaneously, or one at
a time, depending upon the initial conditions of the state variables, i.e., initial levels of
product homogeneity vis a` vis the marginal cost of production. In particular, four situa-
tions may arise: (i) firms activate both types of investment from the very outset to the
steady state; (ii) firms initially invest only in product diﬀerentiation and then reach the
steady state either carrying out only product innovation or carrying out both; (iii) firms
initially invest only to reduce the cost of production and then arrive at the steady state
either carrying out only process innovation or carrying out both; (iv) firms do not invest
at all in either type of innovation, and they are driven to the steady state by the deprecia-
tion rate. The taxonomy of equilibria generated by the theoretical setup we have analysed
is in line with the conclusions drawn by Adner and Levinthal (2001), pointing out that
product/technology life cycle may not necessarily follow the first-product-then-process
pattern outlined by conventional wisdom.
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